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I.

INTRODUCTION

The term “prevailing party” first appeared in a federal statute in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867, which provided that “[t]he party prevailing in the
suit shall be entitled to costs against the adverse party.”1 Since then, it has
become commonplace in fee-shifting provisions of statutes and contracts
alike. In an adversarial process, such as litigation or arbitration, application
of the term is simple: the party to which the court makes an award is the
prevailing party and is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Application of the term is not so straightforward, however, when a
lawsuit is resolved via the non-adversarial process of mediation. A
mediated settlement often is the product of compromise in which neither
side admits liability, but both sides are urged by a neutral to make
concessions to resolve the dispute. The result, while avoiding further
litigation, does not produce a clear “winner” or “loser” as does a court
order.
Courts have generally employed one of three approaches in deciding
whether a party prevailed: (1) the “no prevailing parties in mediation”
approach, (2) the Buckhannon test, and (3) the catalyst theory. Of the
three approaches, the Buckhannon test is by far the most common;
however, few courts or scholars have paused to consider whether its
application, rather than one of the other two approaches, is most
appropriate in the context of mediation. The objective of this note is to
survey how courts have applied the three tests in meditation and evaluate
the effectiveness of each approach in the narrow context of mediation.
Two aspects of prevailing party status in mediation fall outside the
scope of this note. First, courts often award mediation expenses to the
party that prevails in a trial following an unsuccessful mediation.2 Second,

1. See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598, 611 (2001).
2. See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., 1 MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE § 9:19
(2018–19 ed.) (noting costs associated with mediation, including attorney’s fees, as an issue
that is litigated in the context of mediation).
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after attorney’s fees are awarded to a party that prevailed, parties
frequently litigate whether the fees awarded are reasonable.3 Neither of
these topics are discussed in this note.4
Rather, this note focuses on why and how prevailing party status is
awarded following a mediated resolution of a case. Part II discusses why
prevailing party status matters in mediation, focusing on increased use of
both fee-shifting provisions and mediation. Part III explores in depth the
three most common approaches to deciding when a party prevailed in
mediation. Finally, this note will conclude by considering the merits of
these approaches in the narrow context of mediation.
II. WHY PREVAILING PARTY STATUS MATTERS IN MEDIATION
Prevailing party status matters when a party moves for an award of
attorney’s fees pursuant to a statute or a contract provision providing that a
prevailing party shall be awarded attorney’s fees. While this determination
is straightforward following a judgment on the merits, parties that
successfully defend or prosecute an action by reaching a favorable
settlement also may seek fees under the provision. Whether such a party
succeeds in obtaining attorney’s fees turns on the determination that it was
the prevailing party.

A.

Attorney’s Fees Mechanics

Two general approaches exist regarding payment of attorney’s fees.
Under the English Rule, or “loser pays” rule, attorney’s fees are awarded
to the successful litigant.5 In contrast, the American Rule provides that
parties must bear their own costs in litigation regardless of which party
wins.6 Although the American Rule is not always used in the United

3. Id. (explaining that parties often litigate whether the fees sought by the prevailing
party are reasonable).
4. This note also does not explore the process by which attorney’s fees are
requested under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) nor does it explore in detail
statutory and contractual provisions which make participation in mediation a condition
precedent to awards of attorney’s fees. See id. at § 6:4.
5. See Peter Karsten & Oliver Bateman, Detecting Good Public Policy Rationales
for the American Rule: A Response to the Ill-Conceived Calls for “Loser Pays” Rules, 66
DUKE L.J. 729, 736 (2016) (discussing the origins of the English Rule under the
Parliamentary Statute of Gloucester in 1278).
6. See David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-Shifting in America: Comparing,
Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English Rule”, 15 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 583, 585 (2005).
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States,7 and the United States stands alone among industrialized countries
in applying it;8 the American Rule has governed attorney’s fees in the
United States for more than two hundred years.9
Intellectuals pitting the American Rule against the English Rule have
created a “virtual cottage industry.”10 Empirically-minded proponents of
each point to their favored rule’s ability to increase settlement rates and
decrease litigation rates.11 Theoretically-minded scholars vigorously dispute
the effect each rule has on low-income litigants’ access to the courts.12
Fortunately, a comprehensive comparison of the English Rule and the
American Rule falls outside the scope of this note,13 but it is enough to
recognize that the American Rule is generally the default rule in American
jurisdictions.14
Predictably, many exceptions complicate the application of the
American Rule. These exceptions can be grouped into six general

7. Compare id. at 584–85 (identifying Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796), as
the first articulation of the American Rule), with Karsten & Bateman, supra note 5, at 737
(pointing to Potts v. Imlay, 4 N.J.L. 330, 335–39 (1816), as the “first relevant case in which
one can discern hints of the American Rule”).
8. See Jami Rhoades Antonisse, Comment, Attorney Fees: Attorney Fees, Prevailing
Parties, and Judicial Discretion in Oklahoma Practice: How It Is, How It Should Be, 57
OKLA. L. REV. 947, 949 (2004) (“Indeed, the American Rule is so named because the
United States is unique among industrialized countries in its approach to attorney fee
awards.”).
9. Root, supra note 6, at 585.
10. Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American
Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 327, 334 (2013).
11. Id. at 336–37 (noting that the effect of the English and American rules on
settlement rates and litigation rates is ambiguous).
12. Proponents and detractors of the American Rule point to its effect on lowerincome litigants. On one hand, plaintiffs do not risk paying the opposing party’s fees if they
lose, so they are more likely to bring their claims. On the other hand, plaintiffs, knowing
attorney’s fees will be deducted from their eventual award, may be dissuaded from bringing
a lawsuit in the first place. See Antonisse, supra note 8, at 950 (discussing the use of
statutory fee-shifting provisions to incentivize attorneys to “bring suit on behalf of litigants
who would otherwise be unable to pay, or whose suits involve injunctive relief or nominal
damages only”).
13. For a comprehensive comparison of the English and American Rules, see
Karsten & Bateman, supra note 5; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10; Antonisse, supra
note 8.
14. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 328–29 (noting that the American rule is
generally accepted in American jurisdictions, other than Alaska, but recognizing that most
other Western legal systems employ the English Rule).
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categories: 15 (1) fee-shifting imposed by contract, (2) fees awarded against
parties who litigate in bad faith,16 (3) the Common Fund doctrine,17 (4) the
Substantial Benefit rule,18 (5) fees incurred to enforce a contempt order,19
and (6) fee-shifting statutes. The first and last categories of exceptions are
the concern of this note: fee-shifting provisions in statutes and contracts.

B.

Prevailing Party Status in the Context of the ADR Movement

An often overlooked aspect of prevailing party provisions in both
contracts and statutes is that relatively few claims brought under either are
resolved by trial on the merits.20 Rather, parties often settle their claims
using alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, leaving
application of the fee-shifting provision uncertain.21 This section explores
the parallel upward trends in the use of fee-shifting provisions and the use
of mediation to resolve litigated disputes.

1.

The Increase in Fee-Shifting Provisions in Statutes and Contracts

The contemporary wave of fee-shifting statutes in the United States
began during President Johnson’s Great Society legislative initiative and
15. Root, supra note 6, at 585 (discussing exceptions to the American Rule in six
general categories).
16. Id. at 586 (“Awarding attorneys fees for bad faith can derive from actions
occurring in the filing of the lawsuit, and for conduct by parties, or their counsel, before or
after the course of the proceeding.”).
17. Id. (“The Common Fund doctrine . . . dispers[es] the litigation costs over the
range of beneficiaries not involved in the litigation, but who benefit from the fund being
drawn from through court order.”).
18. The Substantial Benefit rule is similar to the Common Fund doctrine but it
“applies to non-pecuniary benefits as well as pecuniary benefits.” Id. at 687.
19. The Supreme Court has “held that a party can collect attorneys fees for the
enforcement of a contempt order when seeking to enforce a judgment through contempt
proceedings.” Id. at 587 (citing Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399,
427–28 (1923)).
20. See Tracey Kyckelhahn & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S.
District Courts, 1990-2006, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (Aug. 2008),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/crcusdc06.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WP5A-2DYU]
(finding civil rights claims resolved by trial declined from 8% in 1990 to 3% in 2006). Civil
rights claims are among those most subject to fee-shifting statutes. See Karsten & Bateman,
supra note 5, at 749.
21. James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 117 (2006) (“Fee-shifting
statutes refer to an award of attorneys’ fees for ‘prevailing parties.’ Consequently, courts
have been forced to decide, with conflicting results, whether there are ‘prevailing parties’ in
cases resolved through mediation.”).
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continued in the decade following.22 The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees
Awards Act of 197623 and the Equal Access to Justice Act,24 later known as
“private attorney general” statutes,25 instituted fee-shifting schemes for
Great Society legislation such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964,26 the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,27 the Housing Rights Act of 1968,28 and subsequent
environmental legislation.29 In enacting the legislation, Congress intended
for the “fee-shifting provisions to encourage plaintiffs to act as private
attorneys general in enforcing these statutes.”30
Shortly after the wave of fee-shifting statutes, in 1984, the Supreme
Court identified over one hundred fifty fee-shifting statutes in the federal
code.31 Today, there are more than two hundred equivalent federal
statutes.32 State legislatures also have adopted a myriad of fee-shifting on
claims ranging from child support and custody33 to housing
discrimination.34 A 1984 study estimated state legislatures had adopted at
least 1,974 fee-shifting statutes nationwide.35 While the American Rule
remains the general rule, fee-shifting statutes have eroded its hold, opening
the door for parties to win attorney’s fees on many types of statutory

22. See Karsten & Bateman, supra note 5, at 749.
23. Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1988(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2017).
24. 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2011).
25. Judge Jerome Frank coined the term “private Attorney General” in New York
State v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
27. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
28. Housing Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968).
29. Karsten & Bateman, supra note 5, at 749.
30. Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon, Special Education Disputes, and Attorneys’
Fees: Time for a Congressional Response Again, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 519, 519 (2003).
31. See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983) (“[V]irtually every one
of the more than 150 existing federal fee-shifting provisions predicates fee awards on some
success by the claimant.”).
32. See Root, supra note 6, at 588 (noting “there are more than 200 federal and close
to 2,000 state statutes allowing the shifting of fees”).
33. See, e.g., TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-5-103(c) (West, Westlaw through 2018 Second
Reg. Sess. of the 110th Tennessee General Assembly).
34. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051, subd. (D) (West, Westlaw through
File 107 of the 132nd General Assembly).
35. Charles W. Wolfram, Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly
Repealing the American Rule?, 47 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321, 323 (1984).
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claims.36 Most often, these statutes award attorney’s fees to a “prevailing
party.”37
Similarly, fee-shifting provisions are commonplace in commercial
contracts. Although historical data regarding the inclusion of fee-shifting
provisions in contracts containing dispute resolution provisions is not
readily available, Professors Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller
recently conducted empirical research demonstrating the extensive use of
fee-shifting provisions in contracts involving public companies.38 They
discovered that contracting parties overwhelmingly opt out of the
American Rule, retaining it in only 37.1 percent of contracts.39 Instead,
parties include fee-shifting provisions that either mirror the English rule,
or a slight variation on it, in 40.7 percent of contracts.40 Often, these feeshifting contract provisions permit awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties.41

2.

The Increase in Mediated Settlements

Meanwhile, parties increasingly rely on mediation to settle disputes
prior to trial.42 The phenomenon of the “vanishing trial”43 in favor of
36. See Root, supra note 6, at 588 (categorizing fee-shifting statutes in four categories:
(1) civil rights suits, (2) consumer protection suits, (3) employment suits, and (4)
environmental protection suits).
37. See, e.g., Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“A computer
search shows that the term ‘prevailing party’ appears at least 70 times in the current United
States Code; it is no stranger to the law.”). But see id. at 614 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (1994) (permitting
awards of attorney’s fees only when they are “proportionately related to the court ordered
relief for the violation”) (emphasis added) (“[T]he phrase ‘prevailing party’ is not the only
way to impose a requirement of court-ordered relief.”)).
38. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10.
39. Id. at 367. The remarkably low acceptance of the American Rule in contracts is
especially noteworthy when compared to parties’ willingness to accept default rules on
access to court (accepted in 89.4 % of contracts) and access to jury trial (accepted in 80.1 %
of contracts).
40. Id. at 352, Table 2. The remaining 22.2 % of contracts either specify that one
company will always pay attorney’s fees or employ another method. Id.
41. See id. at 377 n.207.
42. See Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving

Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) (“Mediation appears to be even more
widely used than in 1997 and is today virtually ubiquitous among major companies.”).
43. “The vanishing trial” was the title of a report, compiled by Professor Marc
Galanter on behalf of the American Bar Association’s Litigation Section, which noted the
dramatic decline in trials between 1962 and 2002. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing
Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J.
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alternative dispute resolution is well-documented.44 Mediation especially
has gained popularity both because courts have embraced it as a docketclearing mechanism and because parties have embraced it for its unique
advantages including privacy, informality, flexibility, and control.45
In 2014, Professors Thomas J. Stipanowich and J. Ryan Lamare
compiled the results of a 2011 survey of Fortune 1000 companies that
revealed the extent to which corporate parties have embraced mediation as
an alternative to litigation.46 It showed that eighty percent or more of
surveyed corporate counsel “viewed future mediation use by their
company as ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’ for all categories of disputes.”47
Meanwhile, only half of corporate counsel said their company was “likely”
or “very likely” to use arbitration, indicating the increased use of mediation
has also contributed to a drop-off in arbitration use.48
The explosion in mediation as an alternative to the adversarial
processes “is a natural response to the cost, length, and perceived risks and
loss of control associated with litigation.”49 Settlements reached via
mediation differ from litigated resolutions in that they lack the
determination that one party “won,” a fundamental feature of the
adversarial processes it is replacing.50

EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). His report noted that while the number of civil
actions increased five-fold and the number of Article III Judges had doubled, the number
of civil trials fell from almost 6,000 in 1962 to just over 4,000 in 2002. Id. While 11.5% of
federal civil cases went to trial in 1962, only 1.8% went to trial in 2002. Id.
44. See Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 42, at 19 (“By the late 1990s, provisions
for mediation were being integrated in commercial contract dispute resolution clauses as a
preliminary step or precondition for arbitration or litigation. . . . In the ensuing years,
meanwhile, the use of mediation to resolve disputes was cited as an important factor in the
dramatic drop-off in the incidence of court trial.”).
45. Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 42, at 51.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 51–52 (noting that in the 1990s “mediation provisions began popping up in
commercial contracts, often as a step prior to binding arbitration” and contemplating that
“[t]his phenomenon alone may account for the observed drop-off in the use of
arbitration”).
49. Id. at 51.
50. See COLE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 9:19 (explaining that mediated settlements
typically involve compromises); see also Michael Diamond, ‘Energized’ Negotiations:
Mediating Disputes over the Siting of Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 26 OHIO ST.
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 217, 257 (2011) (discussing how mediating parties should not view “the
conflict as a battle to be won,” but an opportunity to solve a problem).
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“Prevailing Party” Status Lies at the Crux of These Trends

The parallel expansion of fee-shifting provisions and mediated
settlements pull litigants in opposite directions. Fee-shifting statutes
encourage plaintiffs to file claims while represented by counsel on
contingency fees but limit the incentive to mediate and settle because
doing so could preclude awards of attorney’s fees.51 Similarly, fee-shifting
provisions in contracts encourage plaintiffs to sue a breaching party, but
reaching a mediated resolution to the dispute complicates the nonbreaching party’s ability to recover attorney’s fees.
In her recent note, Alexandra Genoa argued fee-shifting statutes “can
be an impediment to a successful mediation settlement.”52 She noted that
an attorney representing a client in a civil rights dispute will include
attorney’s fees as part of the damages when attempting to settle “creating a
greater divide between the amount requested and the number offered.”53
She argued that particularly in later-stage mediations, attorney’s fees will
often exceed compensatory damages, all but eliminating the incentive for
plaintiff to settle in mediation.54 Instead, plaintiffs will proceed to court in
hope of prevailing and recovering both compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees.55 The risk, Genoa notes, is that “if the plaintiff subsequently
loses in court, both attorney and client will be left without any award and
face costs that could have been covered with a basic settlement amount.”56
Theoretically, at least, Genoa’s concern can be resolved by a
determination that one party prevailed in the broad context of their lawsuit
and in awarding attorney’s fees to that party. In practice, however, courts
have struggled whether and how to make that determination. The
Supreme Court identified that federal fee-shifting statutes “contain varying
standards as to the precise degree of success necessary for an award of
fees—such as whether the fee claimant was the ‘prevailing party’, the
‘substantially prevailing’ party, or ‘successful.’”57 Fee-shifting provisions in
51. See Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017, 1031 (N.J. 2008) (acknowledging
that “the rationale underlying various fee-shifting statutes” is “to insure that plaintiffs are
able to find lawyers to represent them; to attract competent counsel to seek redress of
statutory rights; and to ‘even the fight’ when citizens challenge a public entity”). But see
Alexandra Genoa, How Statutory Attorney’s Fees Can Prevent Successful Outcomes in
Mediations, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 767, 774–75 (2017).
52. Id. at 774.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 775.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 684 (1983). Attorney’s fees may be
awarded to the prevailing party in either the initial or in subsequent proceedings to resolve
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contracts contain similar language.58 When determining whether to award
attorney’s fees following a mediated settlement, the deciding court most
often will award fees if it finds that party was the “prevailing party.”
However, because mediated settlements involve compromises, courts have
struggled with deciding whether a party has truly “prevailed” in
mediation.59
III. APPROACHES TO DECIDING WHEN A PARTY IS A PREVAILING
PARTY
Three primary approaches are used to determine when a party has
prevailed as to the outcome of a mediated settlement: (1) the “no
prevailing parties in mediation” approach, (2) the Buckhannon test, and
(3) the catalyst theory. These approaches are listed in order of their
permissiveness to awards of attorney’s fees. The least permissive “no
prevailing parties in mediation” approach views prevailing party status as
incompatible with mediation.60 The somewhat more permissive
Buckhannon test permits finding a party prevailed provided the court
approved of the settlement in some way.61 The most permissive approach,
the catalyst theory, permits finding a party prevailed whenever a lawsuit
accomplishes its purpose.62
The three approaches discussed here are not exclusive in deciding
whether to award attorney’s fees following a mediated settlement.63 Other
approaches include explicitly defining “prevailing party” under a statute or
a contract,64 permitting judicial discretion to award attorney’s fees where
appropriate,65 requiring that the attorney’s fee arrangement be included in

settlement enforcement disputes; see also Pottinger v. City of Miami, 805 F.3d 1293, 1299
(11th Cir. 2015) (“[C]ircuits have therefore held that under § 1988 attorneys’ fees can be
awarded for defending, enforcing, opposing the modification of, or monitoring compliance
with an existing consent decree.”).
58. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 377 n.207 (“Loser-pays clauses are
found in widely available model contracts.”).
59. See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 9:19 (noting the difficulty in deciding if
there is a prevailing party to a compromise).
60. Infra § III (A).
61. Infra § III (B).
62. Infra § III (C).
63. See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 9:19.
64. Id. (“The specific language in the applicable statute might be the key to resolving
this issue.”).
65. Id. (citing Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4) (2002); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (1990); Safe Drinking Water Act 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (1996)).
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the settlement agreement,66 and directing the trial court to retain
jurisdiction of action to rule on attorney’s fees.67
Nevertheless, the three approaches discussed in this note are
applicable to most claims for attorney’s fees following mediated
settlements. The “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach is
employed by a smattering of fee-shifting statutes and by Indiana courts.68
The Buckhannon test is utilized by federal courts and several states.69 The
catalyst theory was retained by several states after the federal adoption of
the Buckhannon test, but only California and New Jersey have applied it
to mediation.70 The following sections discuss how each of these
approaches operate to determine whether a party prevailed in a mediated
outcome.

A.

The “No Prevailing Parties in Mediation” Approach

The first approach in deciding whether a successful party in
mediation should be given “prevailing party” status is to exclude the
possibility altogether. Although the “no prevailing party in mediation”
approach is less common than the Buckhannon test and the catalyst
theory, its use in a few jurisdictions and bright-line nature warrant
discussion.

1.

Statutory Approach

As a preliminary matter, legislatures may decide via statute to
preclude awards of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in mediation
altogether, thereby preventing the question of which party prevailed from
ever reaching the courts. No statute broadly precludes such a finding for
all claims, but legislatures have constructed statutes that either explicitly or
implicitly prohibit awards of attorney’s fees following a settlement. For
example, California permits prevailing parties in contract actions to
recover attorney’s fees,71 but explicitly qualifies that “[w]here an action has
been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to settlement of the case,
there shall be no prevailing party for purposes of this section.”72

66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Infra § III (A).
69. Infra § III (B).
70. Infra § III (C).
71. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717, subd. (a) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1016 of 2018
Reg. Sess.).
72. Id. at subd. (b)(2).
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In Berry v. Berry,73 the California Court of Appeals applied this
statute to deny attorney’s fees to defendants who opposed the plaintiff’s
petition to confirm a mediated settlement agreement of a probate matter.74
After the plaintiff petitioned to confirm the settlement agreement, the
defendants moved to dismiss with prejudice.75 However, the day before the
plaintiff’s opposition to the motion was due, he filed a request to dismiss
the petition with prejudice.76 Defendants then sought attorney’s fees
pursuant to the mediated agreement77 arguing they were the prevailing
parties.78 Although the California statute precludes finding a prevailing
party after a voluntary dismissal, 79 the defendants argued dismissal was not
truly voluntary because the plaintiff “had knowledge of the court’s
indication of the legal merits and procedural inaccuracies of his petition”
when he filled his motion to dismiss.80 The court of appeals rejected this
argument, however, because at least one issue in the lawsuit was entirely
unresolved when the plaintiff moved to dismiss.81
The court also found persuasive that the plaintiff dismissed with
prejudice, indicating “[h]is intent was to end the litigation concerning the
settlement, not to manipulate the judicial process to avoid its inevitable
end.”82 If the dismissal transpired without prejudice, the court may have
found that judgment on the merits against the plaintiff was “inevitable,”
entitling defendants to prevailing party status.83 Here, however, because
73. No. D062914, 2014 WL 1028887 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014).
74. Id. at *1.
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id.
77. The mediated settlement’s attorney’s fee clause provided, “In the event legal
proceedings are instituted to enforce any term and provision of this Agreement, the
prevailing parties shall be entitled to recover his or her reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
incurred therein.” Id. at *1 n.2.
78. Id. at *3.
79. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1717, subd. (b)(2).
80. Berry, 2014 WL 1028887, at *3.
81. Id. at *4 (noting that “the settlement agreement contains a severability clause,”
and “the parties [also] dispute whether the unenforceable provision voiding the codicil may
be severed from the other provisions”).
82. Id. at *5 (citing Marina Glencoe L.P. v. Neue Sentimental Film AG, 168 Cal.
App. 4th 874, 878 (2008)). There is a line of cases in California “prohibiting a plaintiff
from voluntarily dismissing an action without prejudice when the case has advanced to the
point that a judgment adverse to the plaintiff is inevitable.” Id. (citing Groth Bros.
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. Gallagher, 97 Cal. App. 4th 60, 73 (2002)); Cravens v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 52 Cal. App. 4th 253, 257 (1997); Mary Morgan, Inc. v. Melzark, 49 Cal.
App. 4th 765, 767 (1996)).
83. Berry, 2014 WL 1028887, at *5 (citing Bank of America, N.A. v. Mitchell, 204
Cal. App. 4th 1199, 1212–13 (2012) (holding that when judgment against a party has
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“final disposition of the entirety of the petition against [the plaintiff] was
not inevitable,” the plaintiff was permitted to voluntarily dismiss the action,
precluding defendants from being prevailing parties.84
Alternatively, legislatures may implicitly preclude awards of attorney’s
fees to successful parties at mediation. In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v.
Lyons,85 the court narrowly interpreted Ohio’s statute86 providing awards of
attorney’s fees to victims of housing discrimination.87 In Lyons, a
prospective tenant intervened in an action brought under Ohio’s housing
discrimination statute.88 At court-ordered mediation, the parties reached a
settlement on every issue except whether the prospective tenant would be
awarded attorney’s fees.89 Importantly, the mediated settlement provided
that there would be “[n]o admission and no finding of liability/guilt.”90 The
trial court then denied the prospective tenant’s application for attorney’s
fees, finding that that the language of the statute did not contemplate
awards of attorney’s fees as a consequence of mediation.91 Specifically,
because the Ohio statute required that “the court or the jury in a civil
action under this section finds that a violation . . . has occurred,” the
statute required resolution on the merits as a prerequisite to attorney’s
fees.92
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the prospective
tenant’s arguments that she was a prevailing party and that the statute
should be interpreted broadly.93 First, although the tenant arguably could
be characterized as having succeeded, that was insufficient. Unlike the
federal Fair Housing Act,94 which permits a court to “allow the prevailing
“already ripened to the point of inevitability,” defendant “no longer [has] the right to
voluntarily dismiss its action”)). The court distinguished Mitchell, noting that here “the
probate court made no dispositive ruling on the entirety of Richard’s petition before he
requested dismissal. . . . [F]inal disposition of the entirety of the petition against Richard
was not inevitable.” Id.
84. Id.
85. No. 8-16-05, 2016 WL 5873896 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2016).
86. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051, subd. (D) (West, Westlaw through File
107 of the 132d Gen. Assembly).
87. Lyons, 2016 WL 5873896, at *4–6.
88. Id. at *2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at *3.
92. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051, subd. (D)).
93. Id. at *5–6.
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612, subd. (p) (“In any administrative proceeding brought
under this section, or any court proceeding arising therefrom, or any civil action under this
section, the administrative law judge or the court, as the case may be, in its discretion, may
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party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs,”
the Ohio statute does not depend on a prevailing party finding but
requires a court or jury find there was a violation.95 Second, the court
noted that a broad interpretation would discourage settlement since it
“would force clients to proceed to trial purely to get an award for
attorney’s fees.”96 Indeed, the court pointed out, a narrow interpretation
“arguably encourages settlement because defendants would be aware that
if they lost at trial they would be mandated to pay the opposing attorney’s
fees, incentivizing them to settle at an earlier stage.97

2.

Indiana’s Common Law Approach

Even where statutes do not preclude awards of attorney’s fees as an
outcome of mediation, courts may decide via common law that such
awards will not be granted. To date, the only state to adopt this common
law approach is Indiana. In reaching this conclusion, its courts rely on the
belief that the concept of prevailing at mediation is inconsistent with the
collaborative environment of mediation.
In Reuille v. E.E. Brandenberger Construction, Inc., the Indiana
Supreme Court adopted, at least as a presumption in contract law, a “no
prevailing parties in mediation” approach. In this construction case, the
court considered whether to award costs and attorney’s fees to the plaintiff
who, following a mediated settlement, “received all of the relief he
demanded in his complaint and was able to completely repair his home
from the proceeds.”98 The question turned on the interpretation of a
contract provision providing that the prevailing party in any legal dispute

allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and
costs.”).
95. Lyons, 2016 WL 5873896, at *5 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.051,
subd. (D) (“If the court or the jury in a civil action under this section finds that a violation
of division (H) of section 4112.02 of the Revised Code has occurred, the court shall award
to the plaintiff or to the complainant or aggrieved person on whose behalf the office of the
attorney general commenced or maintained the civil action, whichever is applicable, actual
damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, court costs incurred in the prosecution of the action,
expert witness fees, and other litigation expenses.”)).
96. Id.
97. Id. at *6. But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 10, at 336–37 (noting that the
effect of fee-shifting provisions on settlement rates and litigation rates is ambiguous).
98. 888 N.E.2d 770, 771 (Ind. 2008). Five years after the parties entered into an
agreement for a home construction, the buyer sued the contractor alleging breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and negligence. Id. The parties reached a mediated settlement
on every issue except fees, which they reserved for judicial resolution. Id.
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would be entitled to costs and attorney’s fees.99 The contract left
“prevailing party” undefined.100
The court turned to Black’s Law Dictionary to define “prevailing
party”:
The party to a suit who successfully prosecutes the action or
successfully defends against it, prevailing on the main issue, even
though not necessarily to the extent of his original contention.
The one in whose favor the decision or verdict is rendered and
judgment entered.101
The court reasoned, “This definition appears to contemplate a trial
on the merits and entry of a favorable judgment in order to obtain
prevailing party status.”102 Furthermore, looking to the intent of the parties,
the court concluded the parties would not have contemplated that a party
could achieve prevailing party status at mediation:
[I]t seems unlikely that parties entering into a contract would
intend for a settlement reached during mediation to result in
either party obtaining prevailing party status. One of the
purposes of mediation is to provide an atmosphere in which
neither party feels that he or she has “lost” or “won” a case.
Mediation is meant to remove some of the contentiousness of
formal litigation in order to facilitate the negotiation process.103
Although it noted that “contracting parties can readily agree to feeshifting arrangements that are more prescriptive,”104 the agreement in
Reuille was a “straightforward and unadorned version” under which it
should not be presumed parties intended a successful outcome in
mediation to justify an award of attorney’s fees.105
In its concluding thought, the court floated a policy argument in
support of its “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach:

99. Id. (“In any action at law or in equity, including enforcement of an award from
Dispute Resolution, or in any Dispute Resolution involving a claim of $5,000 or more, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney
fees.”).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (6th ed. 1990)). Black’s Law
Dictionary has subsequently updated its definition of “prevailing party” to “[a] party in
whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (10th ed. 2014) (citing Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603
(noting that Buckhannon relied on the seventh edition of Black’s Law Dictionary)).
102. Reuille, 888 N.E.2d at 771–72.
103. Id. at 772.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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[I]t seems apparent that the bright line approach . . . is the best
for most litigants. The worst approach would be one in which
“prevailing party” is treated with ambiguity or discretion,
provoking litigation about who won the litigation, in addition to
litigation over the appropriate amount of fees.106
Since Reuille, Indiana courts have consistently declined to award
prevailing party status based on a party’s favorable mediated settlement.107
In at least one instance, the Indiana Court of Appeals even extended the
Reuille approach to arbitration.108 Other state courts, however, have not
followed—or even considered to any notable extent—Indiana’s “no
prevailing parties in mediation” approach.109

B.

The Buckhannon Test: Was There a “Judicially Sanctioned Change
in the Parties’ Legal Relationship”?

The next approach considered, the Buckhannon test, represents a
middle-ground approach. While it is more permissive of finding a party
prevailed than the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach, it is not
as permissive as the catalyst theory. The Buckhannon test permits awards
of attorney’s fees based on a determination that a party prevailed in
mediation, but it requires something more—specifically, some type of

106. Id. As this note is replete with instances in which parties have litigated whether a
party prevailed at mediation, the court’s concern appears to be well-placed. The court also
rejected the argument that Indiana ever followed the catalyst theory. Id. (citing Heritage
House of Salem, Inc. v. Bailey, 652 N.E.2d 69, 79–80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); State Wide
Aluminum, Inc. v. Postle Distribs., Inc., 626 N.E.2d 511, 516–17 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993);
State ex rel. Prosser v. Ind. Waste Sys., Inc., 603 N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992));
Id. at 772 n.2 (“The opinions referenced . . . suggest that Indiana has not adopted the
catalyst theory in 1997.”).
107. See, e.g., Delgado v. Boyles, 922 N.E.2d 1267, 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“[I]n
the absence of a contractual definition of prevailing or successful party and a trial on the
merits, as in Reuille, we conclude that litigation which is resolved by mediation or private
settlement cannot result in a winner or loser.”).
108. See Jessup v. Chi. Franchise Sys., Inc., No. 29A02–1302–PL–160, 2013 WL
6198243, at *5 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (declining to name one party the prevailing
party in arbitration when the other side “won on some issues and were ultimately awarded
a greater amount on their claim”).
109. However, the Tennessee Court of Appeals appears to favor the approach, stating
in dicta, “We also observe that this is a case where one is hard-pressed to identify a
‘prevailing’ party. The dispute ended in a mediated agreement.” See In re Nathaniel C.T.,
447 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (denying award of attorney’s fee in a
termination of parental rights case because statute awarding fees extended only to custody
cases).
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judicial ratification of the mediation’s outcome.110 The Buckhannon test is
applied to all federal statutes that award attorney’s fees to prevailing
parties.111 In addition, several states have adopted the Buckhannon test to
apply to fee-shifting provisions governed under state law, including
Hawaii,112 New Mexico,113 Ohio,114 Oklahoma,115 Rhode Island,116 and
Texas.117
The Buckhannon test was the product of a sharply contested five-four
Supreme Court decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West
Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources.118 In that case, the
plaintiffs, who operated care homes and provided assisted living,
challenged a state statute119 under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988 (“FHAA”)120 and the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).121
After failing an inspection because the state fire marshal found that some
110.
111.

Infra § III(B)(1).
See CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC, 136 S.Ct. 1642, 1646 (2016) (citing
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602–03 (“Congress has included the term ‘prevailing party’ in
various fee-shifting statutes, and it has been the Court’s approach to interpret the term in a
consistent manner.”).
112. See Oahu Publ’ns, Inc. v. Abercrombie, 332 P.3d 159, 169 (Haw. 2014).
113. New Mexico has applied the test articulated in Buckhannon since at least 1993.
In Dunleavy v. Miller, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that “the prevailing party is
the party who wins the lawsuit—that is, a plaintiff who recovers a judgment or a defendant
who avoids an adverse judgment.” 862 P.2d 1212, 1219 (N.M. 1993).
114. See GMS Mgmt. Co. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 64 N.E.3d 1025, 1033–34
(Ohio Ct. App. 2016) (applying Buckhannon to deny attorney’s fees under fee-shifting
provision of Ohio’s housing discrimination statute).
115. See Tibbetts v. Sight ‘n Sound Appliance Ctrs. Inc., 77 P.3d 1042 (Okla. 2003).
116. See Direct Action for Rights & Equal. v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651, 659 (R.I. 2003)
(applying Buckhannon to interpret state Access to Public Records Act fee-shifting
provision).
117. See Intercont’l Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295 S.W.3d 650, 656
n.27 (Tex. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff must receive affirmative judicial relief to be considered a
prevailing party.”).
118. 532 U.S. 598 (2001). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court
in which Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined. Id. Justice Scalia also
wrote a concurring opinion with which Justice Thomas joined. Id. at 610 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer dissented in an opinion written
by Justice Ginsburg. Id. at 622 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Although Buckhannon was not a
case dealing with mediation, its broad applicability covers prevailing party determinations in
the context of mediation.
119. W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5H-1, 16-5H-2 (1998) (requiring, prior to 1998
amendments, that residents of residential board and care homes be capable of “selfpreservation”).
120. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598; see 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (1998).
121. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 598; see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1998).
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residents were not capable of “self-preservation” as required by state law,
the Buckhannon plaintiffs sued for declaratory and injunctive relief
challenging the “self-preservation” requirement.122 Before a judgment on
the merits was issued, the West Virginia Legislature eliminated the “selfpreservation requirement.”123 Upon the defendant’s motion, the district
court dismissed the case as moot and the plaintiffs “requested attorney’s
fees as the ‘prevailing party’ under the FHAA and ADA.”124
Prior to the Court’s ruling, the Buckhannon plaintiffs would have
been awarded attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory by every circuit
court other than Fourth Circuit, the circuit from which the Buckhannon
appeal was brought.125 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the catalyst
theory, adopting instead what this note refers to as the Buckhannon test.126
The Court held “prevailing party” was a “legal term of art” which
contemplated awards of attorney’s fees only when a party “has been
awarded some relief by the court.”127
Under the Supreme Court’s rule, the Buckhannon plaintiffs could
not be prevailing parties because, while their lawsuit achieved its desired
result when the state legislature eliminated the “self-preservation”
requirement, there was no “court-ordered change in the legal relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant.”128 Although Buckhannon dealt
specifically with the fee-shifting provisions of the FHAA and ADA, the
Court indicated its holding applies broadly to all federal fee-shifting

122. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600–01.
123. Id. at 601.
124. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (“The court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12206
(“The court . . . in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s
fee, including litigation expenses, and costs.”).
125. Id. at 602 (citing S-1 & S-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (1994)
(en banc)) (“Although most Courts of Appeals recognize the ‘catalyst theory,’ the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected it . . . .”).
126. Id. at 605 (“A defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary
judicial imprimatur on the change. Our precedents thus counsel against holding that the
term ‘prevailing party’ authorizes an award of attorney’s fees without a corresponding
alteration in the legal relationship of the parties.”); see id. at 610 (“[W]e hold that the
‘catalyst theory’ is not a permissible basis for the award of attorney’s fees under the FHAA
and ADA.”).
127. Id. at 603 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)) (stating that
Black’s Law Dictionary “defines ‘prevailing party’ as ‘a party in whose favor a judgment is
rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded (in certain cases, the court will
award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party). – Also termed successful party.’”).
128. See id. at 604 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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statutes awarding attorney’s fees to the prevailing party.129 In the context of
mediation, therefore, the Buckhannon test applies whenever attorney’s
fees are sought under a federal fee-shifting statute after an agreement is
reached in mediation.

1.

Elements of Buckhannon Test

The Buckhannon test consists of two parts to determine whether
there is a prevailing party despite no final judgment on the merits.130 The
first part requires there be a “material alteration of the legal relationship of
the parties.”131 The second part requires the relief be “judicially
sanctioned.”132 Each part of the test must be satisfied to deem a party the
prevailing party.133

a.

“Material Alteration of the Legal Relationship of the Parties”

The first part of the Buckhannon test considers whether a party was
successful enough to be properly characterized as having prevailed, by
considering whether settlement agreement resulted in a “material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”134 Whether the alteration
between the parties was substantial enough to be “material” was not altered
by Buckhannon; prior Supreme Court rulings articulate the standard.135
A party prevails if it is successful on “any significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.”136
Factors the court must consider include “whether the plaintiff (1) obtained
relief on a significant claim in litigation, (2) that effected a material

129. The Court noted its holding’s broad applicability recognized, “Congress . . . has
authorized the award of attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party’ in numerous statutes in
addition to those at issue here.” Id. 602–03 (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(k); Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(e); Civil Rights
Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See Klamath Siskiyou Wildlands Ctr. v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 589 F.3d
1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2009) (“The material alteration and the judicial sanction are two
separate requirements.”).
134. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
135. See Baer v. Klagholz, 786 A.2d 907, 910 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (citing
John T. ex rel Robert T. v. Iowa Dep’t of Educ., 258 F.3d 860, 864–67 (8th Cir. 2001)).
136. Henley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983).
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alteration in the parties’ legal relationship and (3) that is not merely
technical or de minimus in nature.”137
Satisfaction of this element can depend on whether res judicata
would bar a future claim. In Hometown Services, Inc. v. Equitylock
Solutions, Inc., the plaintiff sued on a contract without first submitting the
dispute to mediation as required by the contract.138 The contract also
provided that the “prevailing party” would be entitled to recover
reasonable attorney’s fees and other costs in the event of a legal action.139
The federal court, applying North Carolina law,140 dismissed the action
without prejudice because plaintiff failed to “submit the dispute to
mediation before commencing suit.”141 After the defendant sought
attorney’s fees under the contract provision and two North Carolina
statutes,142 the court denied the motion.143 “The Fourth Circuit makes a
distinction between a dismissal with prejudice and a dismissal without
prejudice for the purposes of awarding costs and attorney’s fees.”144 Since
the dismissal was without prejudice, the defendant was not a prevailing
party, so it was not entitled to attorney’s fees.145
Courts also have found that even when res judicata would bar
bringing the settled claim in the future, the party’s success in mediation
137. Y.O. ex rel M. v. New Britain Bd. of Educ., 1 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 (D. Conn.
1998) (citing Tex. Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 791–93
(1989)).
138. Civ. No. 1:13–cv–00304–MR–DLH, 2014 WL 5335928, at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct.
20, 2014).
139. Id. at *2. The contract provision stated, “Should either of us institute legal action
arising out of or relating to this Agreement, the prevailing party will be entitled, in addition
to such other relief as may be granted, to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and all other
related court costs from the other party.” Id.
140. Id. at *1 (“In the Fourth Circuit, state substantive law is applied to determine the
award of attorneys’ fees pursuant to a contractual or statutory provision.”).
141. Id. at *1.
142. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6–21.6 (2015) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the
2018 Reg. and Extra Sess., including through 2019-4, of the Gen. Assembly); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 6–21.5 (2006) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2018-145 of the 2018 Reg. and Extra
Sess., including through 2019-4, of the Gen. Assembly).
143. Hometown Services, 2014 WL 5335928, at *4.
144. Id. at *2 (citing Best Indus., Inc. v. CIS BIO Intern., 1998 WL 39383, at *1 (4th
Cir. 1998) (holding there was no prevailing party when the court granted voluntary
dismissal without prejudice)); Kollsman v. Cohen, 996 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding a
party was a prevailing party when dismissal was with prejudice). Notably, the cases cited by
the district court predate Buckhannon. Because the Fourth Circuit was the only circuit that
did not employ the catalyst theory prior to Buckhannon, it is uncertain whether this
prejudice-based prevailing party distinction would apply under the catalyst theory.
145. Id. at *3.
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may not be significant enough to be material. The federal court for the
District of New Mexico, in In re Hunt, applied the same reasoning as
Buckhannon to deny an award of attorney’s fees to a debtor who had
incurred fees while attempting to enforce a mediated agreement.146 The
mediated agreement included the following fee-shifting provision: “The
parties agree that this Agreement is enforceable in Court and the nonprevailing party is responsible for costs and attorney fees if any action is
filed to enforce this Agreement.”147 In the subsequent lawsuit to enforce
the agreement, however, the court held that “[s]ince both parties were
ordered to perform, the Court will not award attorney fees.”148
Similarly, winning on several issues but losing on one important issue
may prevent a finding that a party’s success was sufficiently material. The
federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia, in In re Gordon
Properties, LLC, refused to find Gordon Properties was a prevailing party
and entitled to fees associated with either of two mediations.149 There, after
mediation in district court failed, mediation in bankruptcy court was
successful in reaching a settlement.150 After Gordon Properties sought
attorney’s fees for both mediations, the court denied the motion,
reasoning that even if the judicial approval element were satisfied, there
was no basis to find that Gordon Properties prevailed.151 This was
especially true because, as part of the mediated settlement, Gordon
Properties agreed to dismiss a related state court claim which “was a very
important issue to Gordon Properties.”152
The court’s holding in Gordon Properties underlines a primary
obstacle parties face when attempting to recover attorney’s fees following a
mediated settlement. Oftentimes, mediated settlements are satisfactory to
all parties and may not justify a finding that one party prevailed, even if
there was a judicially sanctioned change in the parties’ legal relationship.153
In those circumstances, the “alteration of the legal relationship of the
146. No. 14-13109 tf13, 2016 WL 8115493, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.M. Dec. 23, 2016)
(rejecting all twelve theories raised by debtor and denying his motion to recover attorney’s
fees).
147. Id. at *5.
148. Id.
149. No. 09-18086-RGM, 2013 WL 5379828, at *3–4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 26,
2013).
150. Id. at *3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at *4.
153. See id. at *3 n.3 (“This case presents several interesting questions. One is
whether either party to the settlement agreement was the ‘prevailing party.’ A settlement by
its very nature means that the parties reached a satisfactory resolution.”).
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parties” will not be sufficiently material to satisfy the first element of the
Buckhannon test.

b.

“Judicial Imprimatur on the Change”

The second part of the Buckhannon test is most distinguishable from
the other two tests discussed in this note. Rather than requiring a judgment
on the merits as the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach
requires154 or forgoing the requirement of court action at all as the catalyst
theory holds,155 the Buckhannon test requires there be a “judicial
imprimatur” on the mediated settlement.156 The Supreme Court in
Buckhannon elaborated that under the “judicial imprimatur”157
requirement, “[a] defendant’s voluntary change in conduct, although
perhaps accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit,
lacks the necessary judicial imprimatur on the change.”158
Private settlements, including mediated settlements, are insufficient
standing alone to establish judicial imprimatur, unless incorporated into a
court action.159 Generally, where there is no judgment on the merits, a
court-ordered consent decree is necessary to establish the judicial
imprimatur.160 A consent decree is “[a] court decree that all parties agree
to.”161 As one court noted, a consent decree is “merely the court’s
recordation of the private agreement of the parties.”162
154. See supra Part III (A).
155. See infra Part III (C).
156. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.
157. See Imprimatur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A general grant of
approval; commendatory license or sanction, esp. by an important person.”).
158. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605; see also Christina A. ex rel. Jennifer A. v.
Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that prevailing party status
requires “legal change, rather than a voluntary change, in the relationship of the parties
. . .”).
159. See Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7 (“Private settlements do not entail the
judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to
enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the
agreement are incorporated into the order of dismissal.”); id. at 606 (“Never have we
awarded attorney’s fees for a nonjudicial ‘alteration of actual circumstances.’”).
160. See Sonii v. General Electric, No. 95-c-5370, 2003 WL 21541039, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. June 11, 2003) (“[I]n most of the post-Buckhannon cases in which courts have found
settling plaintiffs to be prevailing parties in the absence of a consent decree, the district
courts had given ‘judicial sanction’ in some capacity, most commonly by the incorporation
of the parties’ agreement into a court order and/or the retention of jurisdiction to enforce
its terms.”).
161. See Decree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
162. See Ad-Ex, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 565 N.E.2d 669, 678 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
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Buckhannon clearly “establish[ed] that enforceable judgments on the
merits and court-ordered consent decrees create the ‘material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to permit an award of
attorney’s fees.”163 It did not, however, explicitly hold that those were the
only methods by which a judicial imprimatur could be established.164
Although courts most often decide cases under Buckhannon by noting
whether a consent decree was entered, courts have split in deciding
whether settlements that do not become consent decrees are sufficient to
establish a judicial imprimatur. In the context of voluntary mediation to
resolve a pending lawsuit, this determination can be critical.
In Melton v. Frigidaire, the Illinois Court of Appeals concluded that
a settlement agreement, which was “made part of the record through an
attachment to plaintiff’s petition for attorney fees and costs,”165 combined
with the trial court’s retention of jurisdiction to enforce the settlement
established a sufficient judicial imprimatur.166 The case applied
Buckhannon to the fee-shifting provision of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (“MagnusonMoss”).167 That consumer-protection statute168 permits consumers who
“finally prevail in any action brought” under the Act to recover reasonable
attorney’s fees.169 In Melton, a consumer sought attorney’s fees after the

163. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604.
164. See id.
165. 805 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Although the settlement in Melton was
not the product of mediation, its analysis is nonetheless instructive in the context of a
mediated settlement.
166. See id. at 328 (“If the trial court’s actions are limited to dismissing the lawsuit, it
has not played a role in the settlement. Its role is passive, at best. But if the trial court
reserves jurisdiction to enforce the settlement that has been presented to it, as this trial
court did, it has used its judicial power to ensure the terms of the settlement will be carried
out. That gives the trial court an active role in the settlement. It is a ‘judicial imprimatur.’”).
But see Baer v. Klagholz, 786 A.2d 907, 910 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (interpreting
Buckhannon to hold that “judgments on the merits and settlement agreements enforced
through consent decrees” are the exclusive remedies of sufficient judicial imprimatur to
justify an award of attorney’s fees).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq. (1994).
168. The purpose of the Act is to “improve the adequacy of information available to
consumers, prevent deception, and improve competition in the marketing of consumer
products . . . .” 15 U.S.C. § 2302, subd. (a) (2000).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 2310, subd. (d)(2) (1994) (“If a consumer finally prevails in any
action brought under paragraph (1) of this subsection, he may be allowed by the court to
recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of cost and expenses
(including attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended) determined by the court to have
been reasonably incurred by the plaintiff for or in connection with the commencement and
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parties settled a lawsuit over a malfunctioning refrigerator, but reserved for
the trial court the determination regarding fees.170 The terms of the
settlement were written in a letter which entered the court record as an
attachment to the petition for attorney’s fees.171 The appellate court, noting
that the trial court was aware of the settlement and retained jurisdiction to
enforce it, held that the consumer was a prevailing party under
Buckhannon.172
The court, in awarding fees, found persuasive the policy behind
Magnuson-Moss’s fee-shifting provision stating. “Limiting attorney fees
and costs to cases where a plaintiff has secured a judgment on the merits
or a consent decree would discourage attorneys from bringing actions
under Magnuson-Moss. It would virtually eliminate the disposition of
cases through settlement, a disservice to the efficient administration of
justice.”173 Accordingly, a settlement agreement plus sustained judicial
jurisdiction to enforce the agreement was enough to find the consumer
prevailed in its settled Magnuson-Moss claim.174
However, Melton’s reasoning is relatively uncommon. Courts have
hesitated to find there is a sufficient judicial imprimatur on the outcome of
a mediation unless the court adopts the settlement agreement in a consent
decree.175 This is true even when a mediated agreement expressly provides
that attorney’s fees are to be determined by the court. In United States ex
rel. Hydrograss Technologies, Inc. v. Lodge Construction, Inc., the parties
reached a mediated settlement regarding damages and left the value of
attorney’s fees to the court.176 Nevertheless, the court denied the plaintiff’s
prosecution of such action, unless the court in its discretion shall determine that such an
award of attorneys’ fees would be inappropriate.”).
170. Melton v. Frigidaire, 805 N.E.2d 322, 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 328 (“The court not only was aware of the terms of the settlement
agreement, but expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce those terms. There was a judicially
sanctioned change in the relationship of the parties.”). It was important to the court that the
settlement agreement be presented to court. Id. at 325–26 (citing Bruemmer v. Compaq
Computer Corp., 768 N.E.2d 276, 288 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (refusing to find Buckhannon
test satisfied in a Magnuson-Moss claim differing notably only in that the settlement was not
presented to the trial court)).
173. Id. at 328.
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 476 (7th Cir.
2003); Doe v. Bos. Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2004); John T. ex rel. Paul T. v.
Delaware Cty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 560 (3d Cir. 2003); see generally Aronov
v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that a suit did not constitute a consent
decree under the Equal Access to Justice Act).
176. No. 2:13-cv-26-Ptm-29CM, 2014 WL 5529288, at *1 (M.D. Fl. Oct. 31, 2014).
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motion for fees, and, on reconsideration, affirmed its denial of fees under
Buckhannon.177 Reserving the value of attorney’s fees was not a “judicially
sanctioned change in the legal relationship,” so “the Court had no basis to
award fees and costs.”178 The parties could not create the judicial sanction
of the change in their legal relationship. 179

2.

Examples of Buckhannon’s Application to Mediation

While Buckhannon itself did not deal with a mediated settlement, its
rule has been applied to mediation in a range of circumstances. The
following are especially noteworthy examples of Buckhannon’s application
in the context of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
(“IDEA”) and the Voting Rights Act.

a.

Application to Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act

Perhaps no other fee-shifting statute has generated as much difficulty
following mediated settlements as the IDEA.180 The IDEA provides a
means for parents and guardians to enforce their disabled child’s right to a
“free and appropriate public education” through a variety of means.181 The
IDEA also incentivizes parents and guardians to pursue these rights by
promising attorney’s fees should they succeed in enforcing their child’s
rights.182
Two issues complicate application of the IDEA’s fee-shifting
provision, however. First, the IDEA has statutorily prescribed extensive
use of ADR, especially mediation, to resolve complaints without
protracted legal dispute.183 The IDEA has been successful in this regard as
most IDEA claims are resolved without extensive litigation.184
177. Id.
178. Id. at *2.
179. Id. at *1 (quoting Am. Disability Ass’n, Inc. v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320
(11th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the district court either incorporates the terms of a settlement into its
final order of dismissal or expressly retains jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may
thereafter enforce the terms of the parties’ agreement.”)).
180. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17
(1997), 111 Stat. 37 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. (2002)).
181. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 30, at 520.
182. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see also Hanson, supra note 30, at 521 (“Congress
intended that the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA would promote its enforcement.”).
183. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 30, at 520 (noting that enforcement tools include
“state-level administrative mechanisms of compliance complaints, mediation, due process
hearings, and lawsuits in federal courts”).
184. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Rep. No. GAO-03-897, Special Education:

Numbers of Formal Disputes are Generally Low and States are Using Mediation and
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Consequently, the volume of mediated settlements of IDEA claims is
high.185 Second, settlements reached in an IDEA mediation are typically
outside the court’s reach, preventing the establishment of a judicial
imprimatur.186
The IDEA provides, “In any action or proceeding brought under this
section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys’ fees as
part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a
disability.”187 Although mediation is an enumerated proceeding under
section 1415,188 an mediated agreement with nothing more is insufficient to
award attorney’s fees to a party under that section.189 Rather, under
Buckhannon, a plaintiff who brings a claim under the IDEA and agrees to
dismiss the proceeding based on a mediated resolution of the claim is not
a prevailing party under the statute. 190 Examples of courts refusing to find a
prevailing party following a mediated resolution of an IDEA claim are
plentiful and consistently deny awards of attorney’s fees unless both
elements of the Buckhannon test are satisfied.191

Other Strategies to Resolve Conflicts 2, 13 (2003) (reporting the number of increasing
IDEA claims resolved through mediation). But see Christopher P. Borreca & David B.
Hodgins, Education of Public School Students with Disabilities, Hous. Law., Mar.–Apr.
1997, at 12 (“Ironically, the IDEA itself has actually promulgated extensive litigation since
its inception as its language is clarified in the courts and the rights of children with
disabilities evolve over time.”).
185. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 30, at 531 (quoting 143 Cong. Rec. S4354-02
(1997) (statement of Sen. Gorton) (“It is the committee’s strong preference that mediation
become the norm for resolving disputes under IDEA.”)).
186. See id. at 545 (“Under Buckhannon, if the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees are not made
part of the formal mediation agreement, it is unlikely that the plaintiff would obtain them
under the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA as now interpreted.”).
187. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (2005).
188. Id.; Hanson, supra note 30, at 530 (“In the 1997 reauthorization of the IDEA,
Congress introduced mediation into the specific procedural remedies offered under the
Act. The provisions for mediation required that 1) the mediation be voluntary, 2) the
mediation not be used to delay the parent’s right to a due process hearing, 3) the mediation
be conducted by a qualified, impartial, and trained mediator, 4) any agreement reached in
mediation be in writing, 5) no content of mediation discussions be used in any subsequent
due process hearing, and 6) the state bear the cost of the mediation.”).
189. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 30, at 546.
190. A.R. ex rel. R.V. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 77 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“[U]nder Buckhannon, a settlement of an IDEA administrative proceeding between the
parties, followed by a dismissal of the proceedings-without more-does not render the
plaintiff a ‘prevailing party’ for statutory fee-shifting purposes no matter how favorable the
settlement is to the plaintiff’s interests.”).
191. See COLE ET AL., supra note 2, § 9:19 n.19 (listing numerous examples of
decisions denying fees under the IDEA).
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In one typical example, a plaintiff who agreed to dismiss an IDEA
claim as part of a mediated resolution of the claim was not a prevailing
party. In RB III ex rel. Batten v. Orange East Supervisory Union, plaintiff
sought attorney’s fees following a mediated resolution of the plaintiff’s due
process complaint regarding his Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”).192
However, because the due process proceeding was dismissed upon
request, there was no relief awarded by the court, as required by
Buckhannon.193 More precisely,
[T]the Hearing Officer’s dismissal order lack[ed] the necessary
“administrative imprimatur” to give the plaintiff prevailing party
status. As the parties did not participate in a hearing before the
Hearing Officer, there is no judgment on the merits. There was
also never a court-ordered consent decree, or a “court-ordered
change in the legal relationship between the parties.”194
In short, settlement via mediation and dismissal of an IDEA claim,
does permit finding a party prevailed and is entitled to attorney’s fees
under the IDEA.195
A stay-put order obtained prior to a settlement of an IDEA claim also
is insufficient to establish either element of the Buckhannon test. In Tina
M. v. St. Tammany Parish School Board, plaintiffs obtained a stay-put
order which allowed their child to attend classes while a due process
hearing to review a change in the child’s educational plan was pending.196
After the IDEA claim settled via mediation, plaintiffs sought attorney’s
fees under IDEA’s fee-shifting provision, arguing they were the prevailing
parties in the prior administrative proceeding.197 The Fifth Circuit rejected
their argument because the stay-put order was neither a “judicially
sanctioned relief” nor a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties.”198
Although the stay-put order provided relief to the plaintiffs, it was not
judicially sanctioned since it was automatic under the IDEA.199 Granting
192. No. 5:15-cv-196, 2015 WL 9582145, at *1 (D. Vt. Dec. 30, 2015).
193. Id. at *2 (“The Court ultimately concluded that it is not enough that a party
achieved some sought-after benefit, but rather a prevailing party ‘is one who has been
awarded some relief by the court.’”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Buckhannon, 532 U.S.
at 603).
194. Id. (quoting J.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 F. Supp. 2d 570, 576 (S.D.N.Y.
2001)).
195. Id.
196. 816 F.3d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 2016).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 60.
199. Id.
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the order was “not a determination on the merits of the case.”200
Furthermore, the stay-put order did not amount to a “material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties” because it did not “permanently alter
the legal relationship of the parties.”201 Unlike a preliminary injunction,
which requires a finding that the party was likely to succeed on the merits,
“the IDEA’s stay-put provision is an ‘automatic’ ‘procedural safeguard.’”202
Because neither element of the Buckhannon test was satisfied by a stay-put
order under the IDEA, the plaintiffs’ stay-put order, with nothing more,203
did not entitle them to prevailing party status.204
While certainly the exception, one case did find the judicial
imprimatur element satisfied by treating a mediated IDEA settlement read
into the record as a consent decree. In Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township
High School District 204, the Illinois federal district court awarded
prevailing party status in an IDEA case following a mediated settlement
because “the legal relationship between plaintiffs and Joliet Township
changed when the agreement was read into the record.”205
The challenge posed by Buckhannon upon the IDEA has endured
since Buckhannon was decided. Several scholars have commentated on
the challenge,206 and courts have at times only reluctantly adhered to
Buckhannon in the context of the IDEA.207 Nevertheless, neither Congress
nor the courts have acted to more readily permit parents and guardians to
recover attorney’s fees under the IDEA following a mediated settlement.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 60.
203. The court in Tina M. identified cases from other circuits in which a stay-put
order plus something more may be sufficient to establish prevailing party status. Id. at 61
(citing Termine ex rel. Termine v. William S. Hart Union High Sch. Dist., 288 F. App’x.
360, 362 (9th Cir. 2008) (awarding prevailing party status when stay-put order was
accompanied by two other rulings which were on the merits)); Douglas v. D.C., 67 F. Supp.
3d 36, 38–41 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (awarding prevailing party status when district court granted
both a stay-put order and a preliminary injunction); Dep’t of Educ. Haw. v. C.B. ex rel.
Donna B., No. Civ. 11-00576, 2013 WL 704934, at *4–5 (D. Haw. Feb. 26, 2013)
(awarding prevailing party status when plaintiffs received stay-put order and a ruling that the
student was “denied . . . a free and appreciate education”).
204. Id. at 60.
205. No. 01-C-4798, 2001 WL 1000734, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2001).
206. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 30; Martin A. Kotler, Distrust and Disclosure in
Special Education Law, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. 485, 525–26 (2014).
207. See, e.g., T.D. v. LaGrange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir.
2003).
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Voting Rights Act: Bear v. County of Jackson

In Bear v. County of Jackson, the Western District of South Dakota
applied the Buckhannon test to deny attorney’s fees to members of the
Oglala Sioux tribe following their mediated settlement of a Voting Rights
Act claim. The plaintiffs sued to “establish a satellite office for voter
registration and in-person absentee voting in the town of Wanblee on the
Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.”208 Following a settlement conference
before a magistrate judge, the county funded a satellite office for the
upcoming election and reached an agreement with the South Dakota
Secretary of State to fund the satellite office until 2023.209 After the claim
was dismissed on ripeness grounds, plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees
and costs under section 14(e) of the Voting Rights Act.210
The court denied the motion, systematically applying the
Buckhannon test. First, the plaintiffs failed to show there was a “material
alteration of the legal relationship” because dismissing the lawsuit as moot
did not alter the legal relationship of the parties.211 Plaintiffs also argued,
without citing authority and without success, that because the agreement
provided that the Secretary of State enforce the agreement to operate the
satellite office, its enforcement “by the executive branch rather than the
judiciary makes its agreement no less public than a consent decree.”212
The court also rejected two arguments that the relief was judicially
sanctioned. First, cancellation of a preliminary injunction hearing following
the settlement conference with a magistrate judge was an insufficient
judicial imprimatur of change.213 An agreement reached via mediation with
a judge “is not the same as a judgment on the merits, a consent decree, or
a preliminary injunction—all of which involve a measure of court action

208. 5:14-CV-05059-KES, 2017 WL 52575, at *1 (W.D.S.D. Jan. 4, 2017).
209. Id.
210. Id.; 52 U.S.C. § 20510(c) (“In a civil action under this section, the court may
allow the prevailing party (other than the United States) reasonable attorney fees, including
litigation expenses, and costs.”). Application of this fee-shifting provision is identical to
other “private attorneys general” statutes. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 805 F.3d 1293,
1298–99 (11th Cir. 2015) (identifying that 42 U.S.C. § 1988 governs awards of attorney’s
fees under civil rights statutes but refusing to find a prevailing party because plaintiff class
had agreed via mediated settlement to limit awards of attorney’s fees).
211. Bear, 2017 WL 52575, at *2 (citing N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Jackson, 433 F.3d
1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (“[I]t would be ironic, to say the least, if the Tribes were
awarded attorneys’ fees against the defendant whose voluntary action triggered this
result.”)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at *4.
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and potential continued court oversight.”214 Second, the timing of the
defendants’ agreement to open the satellite office was “irrelevant in
deciding whether there [was] a judicially sanctioned approval of a material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties.”215
In the next section, this note will consider the alternative to
Buckhannon’s focus on judicially sanction change. The catalyst theory has
no such requirement.

C.

The Catalyst Theory: Did Lawsuit Achieve the Desired Result?

The catalyst theory “posits that a plaintiff is a ‘prevailing party’ if it
achieves the desired result because the lawsuit brought about a voluntary
change in the defendant’s conduct.”216 The approach is more permissive
than both the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach217 and the
Buckhannon test218 because it permits a court to award attorney’s fees
based on a mediated outcome regardless of whether there was a judicial
sanction on the outcome.
Prior to Buckhannon, the catalyst theory was the most frequently
exercised approach to awarding attorney’s fees following a settlement.219 It
was enacted by every federal circuit court of appeal besides the Fourth
Circuit and enjoyed similar support in state courts.220 However, claims for
attorney’s fees following mediation were uncommon pre-Buckhannon
since mediation had not yet gained mainstream acceptance.221 PostBuckhannon, the catalyst theory has disappeared entirely from federal
practice and lost much of its support in state courts.222 Today, jurisdictions
which explicitly retain the catalyst theory include California,223
Massachusetts,224 New Jersey,225 the District of Columbia,226 Illinois,227 and
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. (citing N. Cheyenne Tribe, 433 F.3d at 1085–86).
Id. (citing Coates v. Powell, 639 F.3d 471, 475 (8th Cir. 2011)).
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
See supra Part III(A).
See supra Part III(B).
See Lucia A. Silecchia, The Catalyst Calamity: Post-Buckhannon Fee-Shifting in
Environmental Litigation and a Proposal for Congressional Action, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 2 (2004).
220. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602.
221. See supra Part III(C)(1).
222. See Silecchia, supra note 219, at 2 (“[I]n 2001, the ‘catalyst theory’ was dealt a
fatal – or nearly fatal – blow in [Buckhannon].”).
223. See Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 101 P.3d 140, 156 (Cal. 2004).
224. See Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., 896 N.E.2d 1279, 1291 (Mass. 2008) (“[W]e
rejected the application of [Buckhannon] and its progeny to fee requests under
Massachusetts fee-shifting statutes or other Massachusetts authority.”).
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Vermont.228 Only two of these jurisdictions—California and New Jersey—
have applied the catalyst theory in the context of mediation.229
Circuit courts applying the catalyst theory pre-Buckhannon generally
required that three conditions be met to prevail without a final judgment
or consent decree: (1) the defendant must have given some relief sought
by the plaintiff; (2) the suit must have stated at least a colorable claim; and
(3) the suit must have been “a ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ cause of
defendant’s action providing relief.”230
Dillard v. City of Foley provides an example of the causal
relationship analysis, central to the catalyst theory, as applied in the context
of mediation.231 Representatives of a class of African-Americans sued the
City of Foley, Alabama, under the Voting Rights Act of 1965232 for raciallydiscriminatory annexation policies.233 After a settlement was reached via
mediation before a magistrate judge, the plaintiffs moved for attorney’s
fees.234 While the city did not dispute that “plaintiffs obtained substantially
all of their desired relief in the consent decree,” the parties disputed
whether the lawsuit was “‘a substantial factor or a significant catalyst in
motivating’ Foley to end its unconstitutional behavior.”235
The city argued this causation element of the catalyst theory was not
satisfied because it had “already embarked upon the course of action
[correcting the discriminatory practice], prompted not by any of the
plaintiffs’ efforts, but by the Department of Justice’s prior objections to

225. See Mason v. City of Hoboken, 951 A.2d 1017, 1032 (N.J. 2008).
226. See Frankel v. D.C. Office for Planning & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 558 (D.C.
2015) (“[W]e hold that the catalyst theory continues to operate in D.C.”).
227. See Uptown People’s Law Ctr. v. Dep’t of Corrs., 7 N.E.3d 102, 109 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2014) (applying catalyst theory to the fee-shifting provision in Illinois’s Freedom of
Information Act).
228. See Bonanno v. Verizon Bus. Network Sys., 93 A.3d 146, 154 (Vt. 2014) (“We
take this opportunity to . . . explicitly preserve the catalyst theory as a possible route to
attorney’s fees . . .”).
229. See Graham, 101 P.3d at 156; E.M. v. Millville Board of Education, 849 F. Supp.
312, 313–14 (D.N.J. 1994).
230. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 627–28 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
231. 995 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
232. Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
233. Dillard, 995 F. Supp. at 1361.
234. Id. at 1362. While not relevant to the catalyst theory analysis here, it is worth
noting that the settlement was approved by the court via a consent decree. Id. So, although
this case predated Buckhannon, the outcome would likely have been the same postBuckhannon. Regardless, the causation analysis applied in this case is specific to the
catalyst theory.
235. Id. at 1363.
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Foley’s annexation practices.”236 The plaintiffs disputed the city’s claim,
arguing that its pre-litigation actions to correct the discriminatory practice
were “tentative at best, and insincere at worst.”237 Rather, plaintiffs argued,
it was their lawsuit that ultimately compelled the city to change course.238
The court weighed the evidence and concluded that “the plaintiffs’ efforts
contributed substantially to the accomplishment of their objectives in this
litigation,” so they were “prevailing parties entitled to their attorneys’ fees
and expenses.”239
In reaching its conclusion, the Dillard court noted that the lawsuit
does not have to be the sole cause of the defendant’s subsequent action,
but rather it is sufficient that the plaintiff’s lawsuit plays a “substantial role”
in causing the remedial action.240 Thus, deciding the causation element of
the catalyst theory “is an intensely factual, pragmatic issue,” to be
determined by “the chronology of events, the nature of the relief sought
and obtained, and the role of the plaintiff’s action in activating the
change.”241 An instructive analogy employed by the court was to determine
whether the plaintiff “hopp[ed] a departing locomotive” or “actually set the
train on its ultimately-fruitful course at a time when it was not clear that it
would ever leave the station.”242

1.

The Catalyst Theory’s Decline in the Context of Mediation’s
Rise

The catalyst theory was abrogated by the Buckhannon decision in
2001.243 Meanwhile, mediation had only just begun its move into the
mainstream at that time.244 Indeed, “[m]ediation in the 1990s was viewed as
an alternative to negotiation, not to trial.”245 To the extent the catalyst
theory’s rejection by the Supreme Court coincided with mediation’s rise,

236. Id. at 1362.
237. Id. at 1366 (noting that a pre-litigation letter from the city’s counsel to plaintiff’s
counsel stated he never indicated the city intended to take the corrective action).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1366–67 (“Thus, the court concludes that the filing of the plaintiffs’ motion
for further relief and the plaintiffs’ subsequent efforts to negotiate a settlement played the
requisite substantial role in causing Foley to undertake remedial action . . . and that the
plaintiffs are therefore prevailing parties . . . .”).
240. Id. at 1366.
241. Id. at 1365.
242. Id. at 1366.
243. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 698.
244. See COLE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 4:3.
245. Id.
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there is an unfortunate shortage of caselaw employing the catalyst theory in
the context of mediation.
A Westlaw search of instances in which the catalyst theory and
mediation are referenced together revealed 124 cases, 106 of which were
issued after Buckhannon was decided.246 Only sixteen of the cases
produced by the search were decided in state court, out of Buckhannon’s
reach. Of the sixteen cases in state courts, only four employed the catalyst
theory in deciding whether a party may prevail as an outcome of
mediation, three cases from California and one from New Jersey.247 An
additional six cases in federal court analyzed the outcome of a mediation
under the catalyst theory prior to Buckhannon.248 Five of those cases were
claims for attorney’s fees under the IDEA.249
For context, a Westlaw search of instances in which Buckhannon was
cited in the context of mediation revealed 349 cases.250 All but sixteen of
those cases were in federal court where Buckhannon controls,
demonstrating that the caselaw surrounding the Buckhannon test’s
application to mediation is far more developed than the case law
surrounding the catalyst theory’s application to mediation.

2.

Application of the Catalyst Theory

Although the caselaw surrounding the catalyst theory’s application to
mediation is limited, it is worth considering in greater depth how it was
applied to the IDEA prior to Buckhannon and how California has applied
it more recently in the context of state law.

246. The author conducted the following boolean search in Westlaw: “‘catalyst theory’
& ‘mediat!’” which returned 124 cases. The search was then refined to opinions issued
after Buckhannon was decided on May 29, 2001, which returned 106 results.
247. Consumer Cause, Inc. v. Mrs. Gooch’s Nat. Food Mkts, Inc., 127 Cal. App. 4th
387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Graff v. Vallejo City Unified Sch. Dist., No. A108600, 2006 WL
1073010 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2006); Cordan v. Kahn, No. H029400, 2006 WL
2048290 (Cal. Ct. App. July 24, 2006); Signature Info. Sols., LLC v. Jersey City Mun. Utils
Auth., No. A-1503-14T2, 2016 WL 1064389 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 18, 2016).
The other state cases either rejected the catalyst theory, refused to employ it because the
action dealt with federal law, or were otherwise inapplicable.
248. Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2000); Dillard v. City
of Foley, 995 F. Supp. 1358 (M.D. Ala. 1998); S.D. v. Manville Bd. of Educ., 989 F. Supp.
649 (D.N.J. 1998); B.K. v. Toms River Bd. of Educ., 998 F. Supp. 462, 474 (D.N.J. 1998);
E.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J. 1994); Edie F. v. River Falls Sch.
Dist., No. 99-C-354-C, 2000 WL 34229993 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 12, 2000).
249. See id.
250. The author used the search term “mediat!” to search opinions citing the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Buckhannon.

640

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

a.

[Vol. 45:2

Application to Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act
(“IDEA”)

Of the pre-Buckhannon cases that employed the catalyst theory to
cases involving mediation, nearly all dealt with IDEA claims.251 In E.M. v.
Millville Board of Education,252 a federal district court was called upon to
decide whether the mother of an autistic student was a prevailing party
after reaching a mediated settlement of her IDEA claim.253 In that case,
after the school board proposed transferring the plaintiff’s daughter to
another school, the mother requested mediation.254 At mediation, the
plaintiff sought continued placement for her daughter at the same school
in a second grade class and additional resources for her daughter’s
learning. A mediated agreement was reached; the parties agreed the
plaintiff’s daughter would continue attending the same school and would
receive the additional resources, but that she would enroll in first grade.255
The plaintiff then requested attorney’s fees under the IDEA, and, after the
defendant refused, she filed a lawsuit to recover the fees.256
The court employed a two-prong variation of the catalyst theory,
then-employed in the Third Circuit. The test required determining: “(1)
‘whether plaintiffs achieved relief;’ and (2) ‘whether there is a causal
connection between the litigation and the relief from the defendant.’”257
Although the defendant argued the relief obtained by the plaintiff was only
de minimis since the daughter was not promoted to second grade, the
court held the relief was sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the catalyst
theory.258 The plaintiff “prevailed on the significant issue of the case—
maintaining enrollment at Reich rather than moving to Mount Pleasant.”259
The second prong, the causation element, was satisfied because while the
plaintiff’s requests were previously denied, her retention of counsel and
pursuit of mediation “signaled her determination to exhaust all
administrative and judicial avenues.”260 Both the causation and sufficient
251. See supra note 248. While Buckhannon was decided in 2001, the IDEA was
amended to incorporate mediation in 1997, creating a short window during which federal
courts were permitted to apply the catalyst theory to the IDEA.
252. 849 F. Supp. 312 (D.N.J. 1994).
253. Id. at 313–14.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 314.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 316 (citing Wheeler v. Towanda Area Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 128, 131 (3d
Cir. 1991)).
258. Id. at 316–17.
259. Id. at 317.
260. Id.
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relief prongs of the catalyst theory were satisfied, so the plaintiff was a
prevailing party.261
In another IDEA case analyzed under the catalyst theory, a different
federal district court denied prevailing party status to parents’ suing on
behalf of their child. In Edie F. v. River Falls School District,262 while a due
process hearing was pending, plaintiffs and the school district held several
mediations which resolved all the issues between the parties, yet the court
held there was insufficient evidence to establish the parents were prevailing
parties.263
The court applied a slightly different two-prong articulation of the
catalyst theory. “To satisfy the catalyst test, the court must determine ‘(1)
whether the lawsuit was “causally linked to the relief obtained”’; and (2)
‘whether the defendant acted gratuitously, that is, the lawsuit was frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless.’”264 In Edie, neither element was satisfied.265
Although chronology is a “significant clue” as to whether the lawsuit
caused the relief, standing alone, it is insufficient to factually establish
causation.266 Because the plaintiffs’ on submitted chronology evidence, the
court held its evidence was insufficient “to support the conclusion that
their request for a due process hearing caused the relief provided for in
the mediation agreement.”267 Furthermore, the plaintiffs’ failed to show
that their claim had merit because no facts were introduced “comparing
[the child]’s Individualized Education Program before and after
mediation.”268 Accordingly, plaintiffs were not prevailing parties because
neither element of the Seventh Circuit’s articulation of the catalyst theory
was satisfied by the mediated agreement.269
These two cases demonstrate how differently courts analyzed claims
for attorney’s fees under the catalyst theory compared to under the
Buckhannon test. The catalyst theory was certainly more permissive of
claims for attorney’s fees following an IDEA settlement, but courts
nevertheless conducted rigorous factual analysis to decide whether a party
prevails.

261. Id.
262. No. 99-C-354-C, 2000 WL 34229993 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 12, 2000).
263. Id. at *1–2, *5.
264. Id. at *4 (quoting Fisher v. Kelly, 105 F.3d 350, 353 (7th Cir. 1997)).
265. Id. at *4–5.
266. Id. at *4 (quoting Morris v. City of West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1209 (11th
Cir. 1999)).
267. Id.
268. Id. at *5.
269. Id.
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Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass’n v. Hazelbaker

California has employed the catalyst theory to determine whether a
party prevailed in mediation more than any other jurisdiction postBuckhannon.270 In Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Ass’n v.
Hazelbaker, the California Court of Appeals was called upon to determine
whether a condominium association was entitled to attorney’s fees after a
member couple agreed, via a mediated settlement, to modify their patio to
comply with the association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions.271
The Davis–Stirling Act,272 which governs condominiums and other
common interest developments in California, contains a mandatory ADR
provision as prerequisite to filing an enforcement action under the Act.273 It
also features a mandatory attorney’s fee provision: “In an action to enforce
the governing documents, the prevailing party shall be awarded reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.”274
In California, “[t]he analysis of who is a prevailing party under the
fee-shifting provisions of the Act focuses on who prevailed ‘on a practical
level’ by achieving its main litigation objectives.”275 While the court did not
explicitly identify this as the catalyst theory, its reference to “achieving . . .
main litigation objectives” is the same model the catalyst theory’s “desired
result” test.
In Hazelbaker, the court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
association “prevailed on a practical level.”276 The court explained, “[t]he
270. See supra Part III(C)(1). The California Supreme Court affirmed the catalyst
theory generally in Graham, 101 P.3d at 149, and lower courts subsequently employed it in
the context of mediation.
271. 2 Cal. App. 5th 252, 255 (2016).
272. Davis–Stirling Common Interest Development Act, CAL. CIVIL COD. § 4000–
6150 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 1016 of 2018 Reg. Sess.).
273. CAL. CIVIL COD. § 5930, subd. (a) (“An association or a member may not file an
enforcement action in the superior court unless the parties have endeavored to submit their
dispute to alternative dispute resolution pursuant to this article.”).
274. CAL. CIVIL COD. § 5975, subd. (c). It is worth noting that while the Act makes an
award of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party mandatory, California statutes preclude an
award of attorney’s fees in a contract action after a case is dismissed pursuant to a
settlement agreement. CAL. CIVIL COD. § 1717, subd. (b)(2) (“Where an action has been
voluntarily dismissed or dismissed pursuant to a settlement of the case, there shall be no
prevailing party for purposes of this section.”).
275. Hazelbaker, 2 Cal. App. 5th at 260 (citing Heather Farms Homeowners Ass’n. v.
Robinson, 21 Cal. App. 4th 1568, 1574 (1994)). It is worth noting that this case was not
decided under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1717, so that statute’s provision precluding a finding of a
prevailing party when a case is voluntarily dismissed or settled was not applicable. Id. at 260
n.6.
276. Id. at 261.
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Association wanted defendants to make alterations to their property to
bring it in compliance with the applicable CC & Rs . . . . The Association
achieved that goal, with defendants completing the modifications to the
patio . . . .”277 Although there were some differences between the
modifications initially sought by the association and the actual
modifications, those differences were “reasonably viewed as de
minimus.”278 In addition, defendants could not “point to any success in any
aspect of the litigation itself” to defeat the association’s practical victory.279
Accordingly, the association “achieved its main litigation objectives as a
practical matter.”280
While the catalyst theory has been infrequently applied to disputes
resolved by mediation, these few pre-Buckhannon federal cases and recent
state cases reveal a fact-intensive test that studies what occurred before,
during, and after a successful mediation.
IV. CONCLUSION
This note has explored why and how courts determine whether a
party prevailed under a fee-shifting provision in a contract or statute. It
analyzed the conflicting, parallel, upward trends of both fee-shifting
provisions and the use of mediation to resolve disputes.281 It also featured a
comprehensive survey of the three most frequently used approaches to
deciding whether a party prevailed in a mediation.282
Ultimately, the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach
adopted by the Supreme Court of Indiana is the approach most suited to
mediation. This approach avoids additional litigation after a settlement is
reached, is best suited to protect the confidentiality of mediation, and is
most consistent with the objective of mediation.
Both the Buckhannon test and the catalyst theory permit parties to
return to court to request attorney’s fees after reaching a settlement. Under
Buckhannon, the court must first approve the agreement, then it must
analyze whether a party prevailed by considering whether the approved
agreement constitutes a “material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties.”283 Under the catalyst theory, the task upon the court after

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II(B).
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III(B)(1).
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settlement is even greater; it must make “intensely factual” determination
regarding whether the lawsuit caused the subsequent settlement.284
Under the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach, however,
parties are empowered to reach an agreement regarding attorney’s fees
while in mediation, preventing the issue from even reaching the court.285
Some have argued forcing parties to resolve attorney’s fees would inhibit
reaching a settlement at all.286 In some instances that will be true; however,
when faced with a decision to settle a case or continue litigation, savvy
advocates will incorporate the risk of attorney’s fees into their demands
and offers.
Next, the Buckhannon test and especially the catalyst theory present
confidentiality concerns which are avoided by the “no prevailing parties in
mediation” approach. Under both former approaches, a judge must
essentially decide whether a party was successful enough in mediation to
be a prevailing party.287 However, because most jurisdictions resolutely
guard the confidentiality of mediation, the judge is left to decide whether a
party succeeded without knowing what prompted the agreement that was
reached.288 The “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach side-steps
the issue by directing parties to agree on fees in mediation rather than
asking a judge to decide whether a party prevailed with only some of the
facts.
Finally, the “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach is most
consistent with the objective of mediation. The approach, as evidenced by
its name, is limited. Outside the context of mediation, it lacks the broad
applicability of the Buckhannon test and the catalyst theory. However,
mediation is a unique venue to resolve conflict that calls for a unique
approach to deciding whether a party prevailed. Mediation calls upon

284. See supra Part III(C).
285. See Reuille, 888 N.E.2d at 772 (“[I]t seems apparent that the bright line approach
. . . is the best for most litigants. The worst approach would be one in which ‘prevailing
party’ is treated with ambiguity or discretion, provoking litigation about who won the
litigation, in addition to litigation over the appropriate amount of fees.”).
286. See E.M. v. Millville Bd. of Educ., 849 F. Supp. 312, 315 (1994) (“The very
mechanism which allows parties to sit together in a less formal, non-adversarial context to
resolve disputes would be jeopardized by the threat of a weighty legal fee hanging over the
heads of the [parties].”).
287. See supra Part III(B), (C).
288. See Cassel v. Superior Court, 244 P.3d 1080, 1083 (Cal. 2011) (“In order to
encourage the candor necessary to a successful mediation, the Legislature has broadly
provided for the confidentiality of things spoken or written in connection with a mediation
proceeding.”); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The
Protection of Mediation Proceedings in Federal Court, 60 LA. L. REV. 91 (1999).
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parties to set aside their adversarial approach and work with a neutral
third-party to seek an outcome that is, if not pareto-optimal, more optimal
than litigation for both sides.289 This aspect distinguishes mediation from
other forms of dispute resolution to which either the Buckhannon test or
the catalyst theory may apply and warrants an approach unique to
mediation to decide whether a party prevailed.
The “no prevailing parties in mediation” approach is best equipped
to decide whether a party has prevailed in a mediation because it avoids
protracted litigation over attorney’s fees, ensures confidentiality, and is
most consistent with the objectives of mediation.

289. See COLE ET AL., supra note 2, at § 3:4 (noting other forms of ADR are distinct
from mediation because they involve “contested hearings, which involve adversarial
presentation of evidence (or summaries of evidence) and arguments, resulting in a
nonbinding finding or decision”).
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